1. THAT I am an author and university professor with extensive research over decades on nuclear technology and its associated hazards. I have expertise in the analysis and critique of nuclear technology. Through study and experience, I have formed opinions on the safety records of nuclear ships, which opinions and their basis are contained herein and which opinions I believe to be accurate and true.

2. THAT the statement at paragraph 7(b) in the affidavit of Commander Chesley James Price, filed March 13, 1992, in which he alleges that the probability of a serious accident resulting from port visits of nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered ships "is ultimately remote" has no scientific merit, since it relies entirely on the assurances submitted by the United States Navy. But the U.S. Navy is an interested party and conflict of interest alone would render their claims suspect. In fact, the Canadian federal government has little reliable, independent data on which to judge the merits of these claims. Taking the word of the U.S. Navy on the question of safety is a clear violation of one of the basic principles of environmental assessment, whereby it is incumbent on a proponent to prove safety.

3. THAT Commander Price's claims in paragraph 7(c) of his affidavit, that "alleged discharges or releases of radioactivity (by the above vessels) have in fact had no significant adverse effect on the public or the environment" is again based largely on the general assurances of the U.S. Navy and has little independent assessment to support such claims.

4. THAT the Canadian Department of Defence's reliance on the U.S. Navy's claim of safety lack's credibility. In the first place, the U.S. Navy is enjoined by law to deny or conceal a nuclear weapon accident (U.S. D.O.D. Directive 5230.16). Furthermore, Commander Price's use of the U.S. Navy claim of 3,900 reactor years of operation without a serious reactor accident cannot be independently confirmed. But even if this claim were true, it would not prove an acceptable level of safety. In civil nuclear reactors, a probability as low as one maximum credible accident (MCA) per 10,000 reactor years of operation is often used. This means that even if a ship reactor were as reliable as a commercial civil reactor, the maximum credible accident in a nuclear-powered ship is simply waiting to happen. In the case of all first-time catastrophic technological accidents, there is a length of operation when the probability becomes a certainty, since absolute zero risk is impossible. But it can be argued further that ship reactors are intrinsically less safe than stationary ones due to the mobility factor and possibility of collision accidents. Moreover, independent expert assessors contend that naval reactors are intrinsically less safe than their civil counterparts. Finally, there is no open process to assess the reliability of military reactors.

5. THAT, while many of the claims by critics regarding naval accidents should be more properly described as incidents, even this distinction cannot be independently verified due to the extreme secrecy imposed by the military. Moreover, the loss of entire thermonuclear weapons and entire reactors, now lying at the bottom of the ocean, can hardly be dismissed as innocuous incidents.

6. THAT given the copious documentation on the U.S. Navy's record of accident/incidents and their denial and cover-up, in conjunction with their legal right to such obfuscation, they cannot be viewed as a reliable source for claims of safety. In an earlier affidavit we have cited the poor record of the U.S. Navy in complying with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency requirements. Typical of this unreliability and denial is the case of the collision between a U.S. and Russian sub in the Murmansk area on February 18, 1992 (Globe & Mail, February 19, 1992). Not only was the U.S. sub in Russian waters, a provocative act in itself, but they denied that any damage had occurred, only to admit later that there had been significant damage to the U.S. submarine. The U.S. Navy repeated the same provocative action, penetrating Russian waters, on March 25, 1992 (CCN News, March 26, 1992).

7. THAT David Barnes of the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office (FEARO) has recommended to the Federal Cabinet that, "EARP clearly applies to the decision to authorize port visits by these vessels...National Defence already has the authority to approve the visits and therefore would be the initiating department... National Defence's reluctance to conduct an initial assessment under EARP needs to be questioned".

   This was revealed in a secret memo to the Federal Cabinet and approved by R.G. Connely, Director General Operations, FEARO. This memo also stated: "Reiterate our opinion that EARP applies to the decision to authorize the port visits - re-state firmly our view that it would be preferable to follow the Process, rather than avoid it".

   What is also revealed in this memo is that DND considers the risk of following the due process of EARP as "unacceptable". In other words, DND considers this to be a political issue with considerable risk and wishes to avoid such a political risk. They apparently are not concerned with their obligation to protect the public or to follow due process. The "secret" memo by David Barnes is appended to both the affidavit of John Brewin, MP, and the affidavit of David Williams.

8. THAT further illustrations of the U.S. Navy's record of unreliability are the following cases. In 1980, the Hawkbill, an attack submarine, leaked at least 150 gallons of reactor coolant while sitting in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Bremerton, Washington. Five workers were contaminated, two internally. No independent assessment of damage was done. In August, 1990, four sailors walked off the deck of the aircraft carrier Nimitz into a Seattle television station, where they described widespread cheating on nuclear qualification tests, faulty hardware, overworked crews and reactor problems and, in the case of one accident, they "could not contain the radiation" (both the above incidents described in Kim Goldberg's Submarine Dead Ahead, Harbour Publishing, 1991, pp. 35,36). And while most reactor/coolant leaks yield low levels of background radiation, bioconcentration in shellfish of toxic radioisotopes is very possible. Small changes in background measurements of such releases are insufficient to judge impacts where food chains are involved.

9. THAT contrary to Commander Price's statement at paragraph 7(e) of his affidavit, we assert that visits of nuclear-capable or nuclear-powered naval ships to Canadian ports are not "a significant element of the defence of Canada". Nor do they, in any way, further "Canada's influence in world decisions affecting peace-keeping objectives of the Canadian government". The end of the cold war has thoroughly squelched that contention. In fact, our peace-keeping image would be enhanced by banning them. We categorically disagree with these arguments and challenge DND to prove them. In particular, we ask them to identify the exact nature of the threat to our national security, which nation is threatening us and how such port visits mitigate against such threats.

10. THAT Commander Price's declaration that "small levels of radiation are not dangerous is a view shared by the majority of scientists and physicians who are knowledgable in this area" is categorically untrue. In fact, the very opposite is true. There is a broad consensus among the relevant international experts that there is no safe level of radiation exposure.

11. THAT DND's motion to change this case from a hearing to a trial and their plans to call 20 experts to testify constitutes a real threat to equity since the cost to VIP Society to proceed through a trial would be prohibitive. While the VIP Society is confident it can call any number of independent experts to support their case, they would require assurances of government funding to proceed. Surely it is a violation of democratic process to price the VIP Society out of this case and surely it raises serious suspicions of DND motives, no less than the government's use of Orders In Council.

12. THAT, contrary to Commander Price's claims in paragraph 7(m) of his affidavit on DND safety procedures "ensuring all Departmental nuclear activities are conducted safely", extensive and incontrovertible documentation exists to the contrary. It was hoped that this allegation had been set to rest in several of our previous affidavits, which Commander Price has obviously not read. There are no viable emergency measures for a major nuclear accident.

13. THAT Commander Price's description of the Australian Senate report in paragraph 7(p) of his affidavit does not jibe with independent assessments of that issue, which throw serious doubts on the independence and objectivity of the above report. In fact, New Zealand is attempting the same transparent tactic, but it too is being thwarted by an alert public and independent experts. These are purely political devices to avoid a genuine assessment.

14. THAT all countries with ocean coasts have dumped nuclear wastes into the oceans, not excepting the United States. In fact, the United States Navy secretly dumped many 2 to 3 ton canisters into the ocean 100 miles from Atlantic City in three missions on the 16th, 20th, and 22nd of October, 1947, trips never entered into any flight log (R. Bertell, "No Immediate Danger", Toronto: The Women's Press, 1985, p. 302). But the U.S. record was far worse than this. For over 25 years the U.S. disposed of radioactive waste in 50 ocean dumps all within a few hours of its major coastal cities. Canisters were even dumped in San Francisco Bay. Studies have revealed that 36% of the 162 nuclear waste drums there were damaged or deliberately punctured. Near the Farallon Islands, 23 miles from San Francisco's Golden Gate, 50,000 canisters of nuclear waste were dumped. EPA has reported that bottom sediments in that region were 2,000 times higher than background radiation. Levels near the New Jersey coast were 260,000 times higher. Plutonium has been found in the edible parts of fish (Bertell, p. 303). In fact, the United States has deliberately sunk a nuclear reactor with some 33,000 curies of spent fuel and is still proposing such dumping for 100 submarines.

    The Europeans and Japanese have been dumping and are proposing to dump huge quantities of radioactive waste into the oceans, while the Soviet Union has the worst record of all, both in terms of deliberate dumping and accidental sinkings.

    The assumption behind ocean dumping is that the solution to pollution is dilution. In the case of the very toxic substances this is totally counterproductive, since there is no threshold for biological damage and the possibility of bioconcentration in the food chain is very real. Dumping by the U.S. Navy illustrates the basic lack of concern over waste management and runs counter to the image projected by our Department of National Defence.

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